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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses how a manufacturer and its retailers interact with each other to optimize 
their product marketing strategies, platform product configuration and inventory policies in a 
VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) supply chain. The manufacturer procures raw materials 
from multiple suppliers to produce a family of products sold to multiple retailers. Multiple 
types of products are substitutable each other to end customers. The manufacturer makes its 
decision on raw materials’ procurement, platform product configuration, product 
replenishment policies to retailers with VMI, price discount rate, and advertising investment 
to maximize its profit. Retailers in turn consider the optimal local advertising and retail price 
to maximize their profits. This problem is modeled as a dual simultaneous non-cooperative 
game (as a Nash game) model with two sub-games. One is between the retailers serving in 
competing retail markets and the other is between the manufacturer and the retailers. This 
paper combines analytical, iterative and GA (genetic algorithm) methods to develop a game 
solution algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium. A numerical example is conducted to test the 
proposed model and algorithm, and gain managerial implications.  
Keywords: Supply chain management, Vendor Managed Inventory, Nash game model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is an inventory cooperation scheme in supply chains. 
Under a VMI system, the supplier decides on the appropriate inventory levels for each 
product of itself and its retailers, and the appropriate inventory policies to maintain these 
levels (Simchi-Livi et al., 2008). An early classical successful case for VMI is the partnership 
between Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble (P&G). This partnership had dramatically 
improved P&G’s on-time deliveries and Wal-Mart’s sales by 20–25% and in the inventory 
turnover by 30% (Buzzell and Ortmeyer, 1995). Barilla, a pasta manufacturer, adopted VMI 
in 1988, and became the largest pasta manufacturer in the world in 1990, making 35% of the 
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pasta sold in Italy and 22% of pasta sold in Europe (Simchi-Livi et al., 2008). Dell and HP 
(Tyan and Wee, 2003) buy materials or modules from their suppliers (e.g., ink boxes, cables, 
plastics, circuit board for HP) to produce modules (e.g. subassemblies) and then products (e.g. 
notebooks or printers). With VMI, the products are distributed to retailers whose inventories 
are managed by the manufacturers to meet the requirements from end customers. 
In VMI systems, except inventory management, some degree of autonomies is retained for 
individual enterprises to respond to changing environments. For example, enterprises enjoy 
the right of determining product prices and advertising investments in promoting products. 
Therefore, a question under concern is how each enterprise takes advantage of such 
autonomies in order to maximize its profit in a VMI system. However, it only receives little 
attention in literature except Yu et al. (2009a) and Yu et al.(2009b). 
Module |J|
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Retailer 2
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Retailer |M|
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Supplier 2
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Fig. 1 Supply chain overview  
This paper focuses on the above problem in a three-level supply chain (multiple suppliers, one 
manufacturer, and multiple retailers) with VMI partnership between one manufacturer (vendor) 
and multiple retailers (depicted in Fig. 1). In this supply chain, the manufacturer carries out 
core stages in product manufacturing process. From upstream suppliers, the manufacturer 
selects suppliers for purchasing raw materials or/and product components, and uses them to 
produce modules. Each of the modules has multiple alternatives (options) which can in turn 
be selected to assemble multiple substitutable products. The products are transported to 
different downstream retailers, and are finally sold in markets where the retailers and products 
compete with each other. 
In the supply chain, retailers are able to determine their individual retail prices and 
advertising investments according to their own market environments so as to maximize their 
individual profits. The manufacturer is able to determine its advertising investment for its 
brand reputation, replenishment cycles for raw materials and finished products, platform 
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product configuration and quantity discount to maximize its profit. According to VMI policy, 
the manufacturer normally can not know its retailers’ decision processes but the decision 
results and their demand changes with time. 
The approach we take in this research is to model the supply chain as a dual Nash game 
which is composed of two sub games. One is between the competing retailers in the retail 
sector and the other is between the manufacturer and individual retailers. The manufacturer 
and its retailers are of equal status, and they all do not the decision processes each other. All 
enterprises’ decisions vary with the decision change of other enterprises and the equilibrium 
obtains when all enterprises are not willing to change their decisions, and this equilibrium is 
called as a Nash equilibrium. We propose an overall algorithm integrating analytic method, 
GA (genetic algorithm) and iterative method to solve this model. 
The dual Nash game model and the proposed solution algorithm constitute a powerful 
decision support for solving the competitive supply chain configuration problem. Its use is 
demonstrated and tested through numerical examples. Several sensitivity analyses are 
conducted to assess what effects the competition between the products and retailers has on 
their business performance and what instruments the manufacturer and retailers have in order 
to adjust their business objectives. In the meanwhile, several sensitivity analyses are 
conducted to examine the mutual impacts of decision variables and parameters of different 
enterprises in the supply chain with fair competition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
relevant researches in the literature. Section 3 formulates the profit maximization problems of 
the retailers and the manufacturer respectively and mathematically defines the supply chain 
problems as a dual Nash game. Section 4 proposes brief solutions to the Nash game. Section 5 
gives a numerical example and conducts some sensitive analyses. This paper should be 
considered as the prelude of our follow-up works as indicated in Section 6.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research literature related to this paper can be divided into those on Supply chain 
configuration (SCC), those on Nash games in supply chain management. Although these areas 
are studied by many researchers, models simultaneously dealing with the above aspects are 
complex and sparse, especially those on games happening both among retailers, and between 
the manufacturer and retailers who produce or sale multiple substitutable products.  
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2.1 Supply chain configuration (SCC) 
Graves and Willems (2003) provide a focused review of the literature in this area so as to 
identify the relevant decisions that need to be considered in jointly optimizing 
production/distribution planning decision. In a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) system, 
Banerjee and Banerjee (1992) study how the vendor makes all replenishment decisions for its 
buyers to improve the joint inventory cost. Woo et al.(2001) and Zhang et al.(2007) extend 
their study to a three level supply chain where the procurement of one raw material is 
considered. However, only one product and raw material are involved in their models.  
As reviewed by Yano and Dobson (1998), various models have been developed for 
extending and designing the product line instead of a single product to overcome the cost 
concerns of increased product variety. Kohli and Sukumar (1990) formulate a joint problem 
of designing a set of candidate products to maximize the manufacturer’s profit margin. Raman 
and Chhajed (1995) formulate a complicated problem of choosing products and appropriate 
manufacturing process and product prices. Thonemann and Bradley (2002) investigate the 
impact of product variety on supply chain performance from several different perspectives. 
Their analyses show that product variety has significant effect on supply chain lead-time 
especially when setup times are significant. Huang et al.(2005) design effective supply chain 
systems that integrate platform product decisions, manufacturing process decisions and 
supply sourcing decisions using a mathematical model. They give answers how to generate 
the optimal configuration of the products, manufacturing processes and supply sources in 
order to form an effective and efficient supply chain in a simultaneous and integrated manner. 
However, what is the impact of the manufacturing decision of products on individual supply 
chain members, and vice versa? It is common but widely omitted in literature. 
2.2 Nash games in supply chain management,  
Cachon and Zipkin (1999) discuss Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative cases in a 
supply chain there are one supplier and multiple retailers. They focus on how to use linear 
transfer payments to achieve the optimal profit of the system. Similar Nash game models can 
be found in Caldentey and Wein (2003 ). Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) investigate models by 
assuming that the consumers are sensitive to the price and service quality. They conclude that 
the marginal costs affect the Nash equilibrium result of the dual-channel supply chain. Nash 
game is also used by Cai et al.(2009) to address the effectiveness of price discount contracts 
in different scenarios and compared with some other games: supplier Stackelberg, retailer 
Stackelberg. They show that the price discount contracts outperform that of the non-contract 
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scenarios. In VMI systems, Yu et al (2009a) study the pricing problem in a VMI system 
where the manufacturer needs to purchase raw materials to make products. However, it is 
unknown whether prices discount works in a supply chain where VMI is applied and multiple 
products compete each other. Moreover, they use Stackelberg game by assuming that the 
manufacturer knows retailers’ information and decision processes. However, according to 
VMI policy, the manufacturer normally can not know its retailers’ decision process but only 
the decision results and demand changes with time. Therefore Nash game would be more 
convincing in our case where the manufacturer and its retailers only respond to the others’ 
results without knowing their decision processes. 
Huang and Li (2001) study co-op advertisement in a supply chain context. They discuss 
the relationship between co-op advertising and the efficiency of manufacturer–retailer 
transactions by using Nash bargaining and Stackelberg game but inventory control is not 
considered. Most recently, Yue et al. (2006), based on Huang and Li (2001), study 
coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain where the manufacturer 
offers price discount. Yu et al. (2009b) considers a VMI-type supply chain where both 
advertising and pricing are considered. In the supply chain, one manufacturer vendor) and 
multiple retailers are involved in producing, delivering and selling only one type of product. 
The manufacturer purchases multiple components or raw materials to make the product, 
produces the product and distributes it to its retailers. Each retailer buys the product from the 
manufacturer at the wholesale price, and then sells it to its consumer market at a retail price. 
However, they assume retailers’ markets are independent of each other and only one product 
is considered. 
In conclusion, our research differs from the previous papers reviewed above in several 
senses. We consider: (i) A three-echelon VMI supply chain in which multiple raw materials 
are purchased by the manufacturer to make multiple substitutable products sold by multiple 
retailers; (ii) a dual Nash games where competition simultaneously occurs both between a 
manufacturer and its retailers, and between multiple retailers; and between multiple 
substitutable products, and (iii) impact of suppliers selections and product production 
decisions on the profits of supply chain members. Due to this different setting, some 
innovative algorithms and new managerial insights are subsequently developed. 
3 DUAL NASH GAME MODEL 
This section mainly proposes a dual command Nash game model after we first define research 
context and notations. 
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3.1 Problem description and notations 
For the problem description, based on Fig. 1, we specify the research context as follows: 
(1) There are a vendor (manufacturer) and multiple heterogeneous retailers in the VMI system. 
The vendor is a manufacturer who procures multiple raw materials and makes them into 
multiple modules. The modules can then be assembled into multiple products that are 
allocated into and sold by multiple retailers.  
(2) VMI policy is adopted by the supply chain. The product demand and inventory 
information of the all retailers are available to the manufacturer. With this information, the 
manufacturer manages the inventories of the retailers and its own by determining product 
replenishment cycles. Because the inventories are managed by the manufacturer, the 
retailers pay inventory costs only according the amount of products bought, and the 
manufacturer pays all the rest.  
(3) The retailers sell products in competing markets. Each retailer’s revenue not only depends 
on its decision on retail prices and advertising investment, but is influenced by the same 
decisions from all the other retailers. 
(4) The multiple products are substitutable. The products can have similar functions. The 
revenue of one product not only depends on its retail price and advertising investment, but 
also is influenced by pricing and advertising promotion from all the other products. 
(5) The demand of one product type of a retailer is not only a function of the price and 
advertising investment of the product, but also a function of other products’ prices and 
advertising investments by the same retailer, and the prices and advertising investments 
by all the other retailers on all the products, and the advertising investments of the 
manufacturer on all the products. 
(6) The information exchanges among enterprises are limited; every enterprise (the 
manufacturer and the retailers) does not know their decision processes as enterprises 
realize the risk of revealing too much information. They can only react to the decision 
results of other enterprises. 
(7) In our Nash game structure, a wholesale price is a negotiation result between the 
manufacturer and its retailers within a VMI ally. It is fixed; otherwise the manufacturer 
myopically prefers to raise the price as high as possible.  
The notations used throughout the paper are summarised as follows: 
Sets and indices: 
G : set of products, indexed by g , 
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J : set of modules, indexed by , 
K : set of module alternative options, indexed by k, 
L : set of materials, indexed by l, 
M : set of retailers, indexed by m, 
S : set of suppliers, indexed by s, 
'( )G g : set of products whose production priority is lower than product g, 
( , )G j k : set of products in which the module alternative option k in module j is used, 
( )G m : set of products for retailer m, 
( )K j : set of module alternative options in module j, indexed by k, 
( )L s : set of raw materials purchasable from raw material supplier s, 
( )M g : set of retailers who sell product g, 
( )S l : set of suppliers of raw materials  l, 
Parameters and functions: 
mgDP : demand volume of product g for retailer m, 
mgyeA : exponent of advertising investment yA  on product g in demand function mgDP , 
mgxyea : exponent of advertising investment mga  in demand function mgDP , 
mgxyep : exponent of retail price xyp  in demand function mgDP , 
jkFCA : fixed cost for the manufacturer to develop module alternative k in module j, 
jFCM : fixed cost for the manufacturer to develop module j , 
gFCP : fixed cost for the manufacturer to develop product g, 
gHP : holding cost for the manufacturer to hold product g, 
lHRM :holding cost per unit raw material l per unit time, 
mgHR : holding cost for retailer m to hold one unit product g per unit time, 
mgK : a positive constant reflecting the market scale of product g in retailer m, 
MM : an infinite positive number, 
gMP : time needed for the manufacturer to product per unit of product g, 
mOP : order cost for the manufacturer to retailer m per time, 
mOR : order cost for retailer m per time, 
sORM : order cost per time for the manufacturer to procure raw materials from supplier s, 
jkPCA : module alternative option k’s production cost in module j for the manufacturer, 
slPCR : procurement cost of material l from supplier s, 
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gPCP : production cost for product g, 
mgpw : wholesale price of product g for retailer m after price discount, 
gpw : wholesale price for product g before price discount (the same to all retailers), 
TA : the upper bound of advertising investment for the manufacturer, 
mTa : the upper bound of advertising investment for retailer m , 
TMP : total available man-hours for the manufacturer, 
mgTP : transportation cost of product g for retailer m, 
slTRM : transportation cost of raw material l from supplier s, 
TVP : total inventory space available for the manufacturer, 
mTVR : total inventory space available for retailer m, 
mgxyv : coefficient of advertising investment xya  in demand function mgDP , 
mgyu : coefficient of advertising investment yA  in demand function mgDP , 
gV :  space occupied by a unit of product g, 
lVRM : space occupied by a unit of raw material l, 
gjkδ : required number of module alternative option k in module j per product g, 
 jklσ : required number of raw material l for producing one unit of module alternative option k 
in module j, 
mgxyβ : coefficient of retail price xyp  in demand function mgDP , 
mw  ( 1 2mw≤ ≤ ): inventory space sharing factor of retailer m’s warehouse ( 2mw =  for 
dedicated storage, and mw  is normally close to 1 for random storage), 
0w ( 01 2w≤ ≤ ): inventory space sharing factor of the manufacturer’s warehouse ( 0 2w =  for 
dedicated storage, and 0w  is close to 1 for random storage), 
0NP : profit for the manufacturer, 
mNP : profit for retailer m, 
Decision variables for the manufacturer: 
gA : advertising investment per unit time by manufacturer for its brand image ($/time), 
jkDA : demand volume of alternative option k in module j in product g, 
mc : replenishment cycle for retailer m, 
scrm : replenishment cycle for the manufacturer procuring raw materials from supplier s, 
sldrm : demand rate of raw material l from supplier s (representing that raw material l from 
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supplier s is not selected if sldrm =0), 
jkfpa : binary variable to indicate whether to develop (select) module alternative k in module j, 
jfpm : binary variable to indicate whether to develop (select) module j, 
gfpp : binary variable to indicate whether product g is developed by the manufacturer or not, 
gρ : discount rate of product g of the manufacturer to retailers (for the manufacturer), 
Decision variables for retailers:  
mga : advertising investment per unit time for retailer m ($/time), 
mgp : product retail price of product g for retailer m. 
3.2 Framework of Dual Nash Game Model 
The dual Nash game depicted in Fig. 2 consists of two sub-games: a horizontal RR-Nash 
game and a vertical MR-Nash game.  
Among the retailers, the decision process of retailer m M∈  is not disclosed to the 
others. However its decision results of ',m ga , ',m gp ' , 'm M m m∈ ≠  ( ')g G m∈  of the other 
retailers are observable, can be taken used of, and then influence their profits. This forms a 
Nash game among all the retailers which is called RR-Nash game. 
RR-Nash game
The manufacturer
（DAjk, DPmg, drmsl, cm, crms, fpajk, fpmj,
Ag, fppg, ρg ）
Retailer 1
(a1g , p1g g    G(1))∈
Retailer 2
(a2g , p2g g    G(1))
Retailer |M|
(a|M| g  , p|M| g g    G(1))
…∈ ∈
M
R
-N
as
h 
ga
m
e
 
Note: [1] The variables in the brackets are decision variables; [2] The variables in bold are those whose values 
can affect other enterprises’ profits. 
Fig. 2 The dual Nash games=(RR-Nash game) + (MR-Nash game) 
Similarly, between the manufacturer and retailer m M∈ , the manufacturer’s decision is 
influenced by the decision results of mga , mgp  m M∈  ( )g G m∈  from its |M| retailers. The 
decision of retailer m M∈  on mga , mgp  ( )g G m∈  is influenced by the manufacturer’s decision 
on ,gA ,gfpp  gρ  , ( )m M g G m∈ ∈ . The interactions between them form a Nash game which is 
called MR-Nash game here. 
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In the game system, every enterprise reacts to the decisions of the others. The whole 
system could reach such a stable situation (a Nash equilibrium) where no enterprises are 
willing to change their decisions as the change can not improve their own profits. That is to 
say, the profit of each enterprise is maximized which reaches the so-called overall Nash 
equilibrium; both RR-Nash game and MR-Nash game are in equilibrium. 
3.3 Formulation of RR-Nash game 
RR-Nash game is modeled in Fig. 3; retailer m’s profit in Equation (5) is determined by its 
revenue 
( )
mg mg
g G m
DP p
∈
∑  minus the total costs of buying products 
( )
mg mg
g G m
DP pw
∈
∑ ,  inventory 
cost 
( )
mg mg
g G m
DPζ
∈
∑ , and the advertising investment 
( )
mg
g G m
a
∈
∑ . For the inventory cost, in 
accordance with the VMI policy mentioned in subsection 3.1, the inventory management are 
in the charge of  the manufacturer, and a retailer only pays its inventory cost appropriate to its 
demand (without order costs and holding cost).  
HORIZONTAL GAME: RR-NASH: 
GAME PLAYERS: all the retailers in M  
GIVEN (for all the retailers):  Decision results from the manufacturer: gA , gfpp  and gρ . 
GIVEN (for m M∀ ∈ ): 
  The related fixed parameters and set parameters given in Subsection 3.1, 
  Variable results of the other competitive retailers: xgp  and xga , ,x m x M≠ ∈ ( )g G x∈ . 
FIND (for m M∀ ∈ ): mgp  and mga  ( )g G m∈ . 
SATISFY (for m M∀ ∈ ): 
  Wholesale price and demand functions:  
 
, ( )
( )  ( )mgy mgxy mgxyeA ep eamg mg mgy y mgxy xy mgxy xy
y G x M y G x
DP K u A p v a g G mβ
∈ ∈ ∈
= + + + ∈∑ ∑  (1) 
 0  ( )mg g g mgpw pw DP g G mρ= − ∈  (2) 
  Resources constraints:  
( )
/2   m m mg g m
g G m
w c DP V TVR m M
∈
≤ ∀ ∈∑  (3) 
 
( )
mg m
g G m
a Ta
∈
≤∑ . (4) 
MAXIMIZE (for m M∀ ∈ ): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m mg mg mg mg mg mg mg
g G m g G m g G m g G m
NP DP p DP pw DP aζ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . (5) 
Fig. 3 RR-Nash game model 
With given decision results from the manufacturer on gA , mc , gfpp  and gρ , retailer m’s 
profits is not only determined by its decision on pricing mgp  and advertising mga , but also 
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heavily influenced by the decisions from the other retailers on their xgp  and xga , 
,x m x M≠ ∈ , ( )g G x∈ shown in Eq. (1) in which mgxyβ , mgxyea , mgyeA , mgxyep , mgyu , mgxyv  are 
given in line with the properties: 0mg
mg
DP
p
∂ <∂ , 0
mg
xy
DP
p
∂ >∂ , 0
mg
mg
DP
a
∂ >∂ , 0
mg
xy
DP
a
∂ <∂ , 
, , ( )x m or y g x M y G x≠ ≠ ∈ ∈ . 
These properties represent a common definition of substitutable products which goes back 
to Samuelson (1947). Moreover, the substitution among different products is defined.  
Subsequently, retailer m’s purchasing prices (wholesale prices) of the product from the 
manufacturer is influenced according to Eq. (2). 
Besides, retailer m’s resources may restraint its profit by its own warehousing capacity (see 
Eq. (3)) and available budget (see Eq. (4)).  
In conclusion, in the RR-Nash game circumstances, it is important for individual 
enterprises to give their optimal response by determining mgp and mga  for maximizing their 
net profits under the competition among the different enterprises and different products. 
3.4 Formulation of the MR-Nash game 
The MR-Nash is depicted in Fig. 4 where the decisions between the manufacturer and a 
retailer ( m M∀ ∈ ) are dependent each other while they are maximizing their individual profits. 
Retailer m’s demand for product g, mgDP  (presented in Eq. (1)) is influenced by the 
manufacturer’s advertising with 0mg
g
DP
A
∂ >∂  and 0
mg
y
DP
A
∂ <∂ , ,y g y G≠ ∈ . Retailer m’s 
purchasing price of product g ( mgpw ) is determined by the given decisions of the manufacturer 
on 0gpw  and gρ  (see Eq. (2)). 
For the manufacturer, its net profit is the revenue 
( )
mg mg
m M g G m
DP pw
∈ ∈
∑ ∑  minus the total costs 
including the costs to manage inventories at the retailers’ side 1( m
mm M
OR
c∈
∑
( ) 2
m mg mg
m Mg Gm
c DP HR
∈ ∈
+∑ ∑  
( )
)mg mg
m M g G m
DPζ
∈ ∈
−∑ ∑ , the inventory costs at the manufacturer’s side 1( m
mm M
OP
c∈
∑  
( )
)
2
m mg g
m M g G m
c DP HP
∈ ∈
+ ∑ ∑
( )
1
( )
2
s sl l
s
ss S s S l L s
crmdrm HRM
ORM
crm∈ ∈ ∈
+ +∑ ∑∑ , the transport costs 
( )
mg mg
m Mg Gm
DP TP
∈ ∈
∑ ∑ , 
the variable production or purchasing costs of the products, modules and raw materials 
( )
mg g
m M g G m
DP PCP
∈ ∈
∑ ∑
( )
jk jk
j J k K j
DA PCA
∈ ∈
+∑ ∑ sl sl
s S l L
drm PCR
∈ ∈
+∑∑ , the fix costs for producing or  
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VERTICAL GAME: MR-NASH: 
GAME PLAYERS: m M∀ ∈ , and the manufacturer 
GIVEN (from all the other retailers): 
  Decision results from the other retailers ,x m x M≠ ∈ : xgp  and xga , ( )g G x∈ . 
GIVEN (for the manufacturer): 
The fixed parameters and set parameters given in Subsection 3.1, 
  Decision results for retailer m: mga  and mgp . 
FIND (for the manufacturer): 
  gA , mc , scrm , sldrm , gfpp , jfpm , jkfpa , and gρ  
SATISFY (for the manufacturer): 
Wholesale price and demand functions: constraints (1) and (2) . 
Logical constraints of BOM: 
( , ) ( )
( )jk gjk mg
g G j k m M g
DA DPδ
∈ ∈
= ∑ ∑   , ( )j J k K j∀ ∈ ∈                   (6) 
 
( )
      ( , )sl jkl jk
s S j J k K j
drm DA l L j kσ
∈ ∈ ∈
= ∀ ∈∑ ∑ ∑  (7) 
Resource constraints:  0
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
m mg gs sl l
l L s S l m M g G m
c DP Vcrm drm VRM
w TVP
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ ≤∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (8) 
 
( )
/2   m m mg g m
g G m
w c DP V TVR m M
∈
≤ ∀ ∈∑  (9) 
 
( )
mg g
m M g G m
DP MP TMP
∈ ∈
≤∑ ∑  (10) 
 g
g G
A TA
∈
≤∑  (11) 
 maxg gA A g G≤ ∈  (12) 
  Logical constraints of fixed costs:  
( )
   mg g
m M g
DP MM fpp g G
∈
≤ ⋅ ∀ ∈∑  (13) 
   ( ) ( , ) g jkfpp MM fpa j J k K j g G j k≤ ⋅ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈  (14) 
 
( )
    jk j
k K j
fpa MM fpm j J
∈
≤ ⋅ ∀ ∈∑  (15) 
  Order of precedence:  ' ' ', ( )ggfpp fpp g G g G g≤ ∀ ∈ ∈  (16) 
MAXIMIZE (for the manufacturer): 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( )
2
m mg mg
mg mg m mg mg
mm M g G m m M m M g G m m M g G m
c DP HR
NP DP pw OR DP
c
ζ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
( ) ( )
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
m mg g s sl l
m s
m sm M m M g G m s S s S l L s
c DP HP crm drm HRM
OP ORM
c crm∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− + − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
( ) ( ) ( )
mg mg mg g jk jk sl sl
m M g G m m M g G m j J k K j s S l L
DP TP DP PCP DA PCA drm PCR
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑  
( )
g g j j jk jk
g G j J j J k K j
fpp FCP fpm FCM fpa FCA
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
( )
g
g G m
A
∈
− ∑ .                                         (17) 
For retailer m, “GIVEN”, “FIND”, “SATISFY” and “MAXIMIZE” refer to Fig. 3. 
Fig. 4 MR-Nash game model 
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purchasing products, modules and raw materials g g
g G
fpp FCP
∈
∑  j j
j J
fpm FCM
∈
+∑
( )
jk jk
j J k K j
fpa FCA
∈ ∈
+∑∑ , 
and the advertising expenditure 
( )
g
g G m
A
∈
∑  for promoting the products. All these costs and the 
revenue are dependent on the pricing and advertising of individual retailers that influence the 
demands of products, mgDP  (see Eq. (1)), and then the demands of the modules jkDA , and of 
the raw materials sls S drm∈∑ . 
Moreover, the manufacturer’s profit is affected by its only constraints from product 
structures (see Eqs. (6) and (7)), available resources (see Eqs. (8)-(12)), fixed or setup costs 
(see Eqs. (13)-(15)) and the priority order for producing products (see Eq. (16)) if the 
resources are not abundant. We give further explanation of some constraints helping in 
understanding the model; Eq. (6) presents that to produce the units of 
( ) mgm M g
DP∈∑  products, 
the requirement of alternative option j in module k is jkDA . In Eq. (8), the value of 0w  
depends on the various factors including storage policies, number of stored items types, etc. If 
the manufacturer uses the dedicated storage policy with which every item type occupies a 
predetermined and unsharable space, 0w  equals 2 and means that the require storage space is 
two times of the average storage level 
( ) ( )2 2
m mg gs sl l
l L s S l m M g G m
c DP Vcrm drm VRM
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . If the 
random storage policy is applied, 0w  is close to 1 as multiple item types can share their 
storage spaces.  
4 SOLUTION ALGORITHM FOR NASH EQUILIBRIUM  
To obtain the equilibrium, we have to obtain: (i) the optimal response of individual enterprises 
to decision results of the other enterprises and (ii) the equilibrium conditions of the Nash 
Equilibrium. This section defines the response functions and the equilibrium conditions in 
subsection 4.1, discusses the calculation of the RR-Nash equilibrium in subsection 4.2. The 
manufacturer’s optimal response function is developed in subsection 4.3, and the algorithm to 
find the global dual Nash game equilibrium is given in subsection 4.4. 
4.1 Introduction of calculating Nash equilibriums 
To simplify the explanation thereafter, we let 0x  denote the set of the decision variables 
( , ,sl mdrm c  ,scrm  ,jkfpa jfpm , gfpp , gA , gρ , , ,s S l L∈ ∈ , g G∈ , ( )k K j∈ , j J∈ , m M∈ ) of the 
manufacturer, and mx  represents the decision variables ( * *, , ( )mg mga p g G m∈ ) of retailer m, 
m M∈ . For enterprise m, the set of decision variables of all the other enterprises is denoted as 
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0 1 1 1 | |{ , ,..., , ,..., }m m m Mx x x x x x− − += , {0}m M∈ ∪ . Therefore, the response function of enterprise m 
can be defined as: 
 ( )m m mx r x−= , (18) 
which means that the decision, mx , of enterprise m is a function, ( )mr i , of the variable mx− . 
For realizing a Nash equilibrium, the enterprises (players) normally are in a dynamic 
reaction process with multiple interactive and iterative stages. At any given stage k, with the 
decision results kmx−  of the other enterprises, enterprise m would make a response with: 
 1 ( )k km m mx r x+ −=  (19) 
to obtain its optimal decision 1kmx +  for stage k+1. 
With Eq.(19), the Nash game can be reached if it exists and satisfies (Liu, 1998): 
 
| |
1
0
( ) 0
M
k k
m m m
m
x r x+ −
=
− ==∑ . (20) 
4.2 Solving the Nash equilibrium of RR-Nash game 
Let mλ  and mγ  be the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (3) and (4) in Fig. 3. The Lagrange 
function mL  of retailer m’s model can then be expressed as follows:  
 
( ) ( )
( / 2 ) ( )m m m m m mg g m m mg m
g G m g G m
L NP w c DP V TVR a Taλ γ
∈ ∈
= − − + −∑ ∑  (21) 
Then the optimal decision of mgp  and mga of retailer m is determined by Kuhn-Tucker 
condition given in Eqs (22)-(25). 
 
( )
0,    ( ),
2
mg gm m m
mj mjg G m
DP VNP c
j G m
p p
λ
∈
∂∂ + = ∈∂ ∂∑  (22) 
 
( )
0,    ( ),
2
mg gm m m
m
mj mjg G m
DP VNP c
j G m
a a
λ γ
∈
∂∂ + + = ∈∂ ∂∑  (23) 
 ( )( ) 0,
2
m m mg gg G m
m m
w c DP V
TVRλ ∈ − =∑  (24) 
 
( )
( ) 0.m mg m
g G m
a Taγ
∈
− =∑  (25) 
The number of variables mja , mjp , mγ  and mλ  ( )j G m∈  is equal to that of equality equations. 
By solving the simultaneous Eqs. (22)-(25), we have 
 ( )m m mx r x m M−= ∈ . (26) 
To repeat the decision process above for each retailer, we can obtain the optimal response 
function of every retailer. Therefore, for any given decision from the manufacturer, the RR-
Nash game equilibrium can be obtained by solving the simultaneous equations (22)-(25) 
where m=1,…, |M|. 
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Obviously, by setting ( , ) ( , )k km m m mx x x x− −= , for any given 0x , the solutions, 0 1 | |( ,..., )Mx x x− = , 
of the simultaneous equations (22)-(25) with m=1,…,|M| satisfy: 
 
| |
1
1
( ) 0
M
k k
m m m
m
x r x+ −
=
− ==∑ . (27) 
According to Eq.(20), the RR-Nash equilibrium is then reached. 
However, Eqs. (22)-(25) are nonlinear. The first step to resolve this kind of equations is to 
transform it into a series of linear simultaneous equations, and then to solve these linearized 
equations. Here, Newton-Raphson method (Press et al., 2007), which is convergence of 2( )O n  
and n is the number of variables, is used for transforming the simultaneous equation into 
linearized equations. Therefore, the RR-Nash game equilibrium is obtained. 
4.3 Optimizing the manufacturer’s response 
To obtain the global Nash equilibrium, we should determine how the manufacturer gives its 
optimal reaction as a function of any given decisions from its retailers as a whole. 
The manufacturer determines its optimal market and production decision variables under 
the MR-Nash model depicted in Fig. 4. Because several variables such as gfpp  g G∈  are not 
continuous variables, the Kuhn-Tucker condition cannot be applied here. Existing commercial 
software packages such as Lingo and CPLEX do not work effectively and cannot guarantee 
the optimal solution due to the possible existence of multiple local optimal solutions. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to integrate the solution of the RR game with that of MR game 
within such commercial software packages. Fortunately, these difficulties can be overcome by 
GA (genetic algorithm). We therefore adopt it as it is almost mature and widely used by other 
researchers (see Akyol and Bayhan, 2007; Liu, 1998; Solnon et al., 2008).The roulette wheel 
selection approach (Yang et al., 2007) and the elitist strategy(Onwubolu and Muting, 2001) 
are integrated to ensure that the best chromosomes can survive in the evolution. 
We adopt the GA framework of Michalewicz (1996). With the algorithm we can find: 
 0 0 0( )x r x−= . (28) 
There are some disadvantages to use the above GA directly. Generally, all the constraints 
are relaxed as penalty terms added to the objective function (the summation is called fitness 
function in GAs). The fitness function is used to evaluate the performance of GAs. The 
performance of a GA generally depends on the number of relaxed constraints, and the number 
of decision variables. The larger these numbers are, the worse performance (in terms of 
computation time to find a satisfactory solution) a GA has. Therefore, we simplify the 
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manufacturer’s decision model by eliminating some constraints and variables in order to 
improve the GA performance. 
For equality constraints (6)-(7), they can be eliminated by substituting them into the 
objective function (17) or corresponding constraints. For example, Eq. (6) can be eliminated 
by replacing all jkDA  in Eqs. (7) and (17) with 
( , ) ( )
( )gjk mg
g G j k m M g
DPδ
∈ ∈
∑ ∑ . Meanwhile, the 
variable jkDA  is eliminated. Moreover, the logical constraints (Eqs. (13)-(15)) for fixed costs 
can be replaced with “if…then…” sentences in programming codes.  
For eliminating some variables, for example mc , we can calculate * 2 /m m mg g
g G
c OP DP HP
∈
= ∑  
(by solving 0 / 0mNP c∂ ∂ = ) once the values mgDP  ( )g G m∈  in the GA programming codes are 
obtained. With mc  and mgDP , we can obtain 
( )
/2m m mg g
g G m
w c DP V
∈
∑  (the right term of Eq. (9)), 
and then we check whether it is = or < mTVR . If “<” holds, *mc  is the optimum and we do not 
need use “crossover” or “mutation” to generate a new *mc  for the given mgDP . The similar 
simplification applies to scrm  s S∈ . 
After the above simplifications, the fitness function, Fitness0 for the manufacturer’s 
decision becomes: Eq. (17) plus the discrepancies of Eqs. (8)-(12) and (16). The discrepancy 
of Eq. (9) is 
( )
( /2 )m m mg g m
m M g G m
f w c DP V TVR
∈ ∈
−∑ ∑  where f<0 is a penalty factor. The 
calculations of the other discrepancies are similar.  
4.4 The global Nash equilibrium of the dual Nash Game 
With the obtained response function of the manufacturer (see Eq. (28)) and the RR-Nash 
game equilibrium (determined by Eqs. (22)-(25) with m=1,…,|M|), the global equilibrium of 
the dual game can be obtained with the procedures given in Fig. 5 in which k  is the number 
of iterations for interactions among enterprises (see also Eq. (19)) and n  is the number of 
times to initialize 0
kx  and 0
kx− . In Fig. 5, there are five algorithmic steps:  
Step 0: Randomly initialize the decision variables 0
kx  and 0 1 | |( ,..., )
k k k
Mx x x− = , with k=0 
where k is the iterative reaction stages between the enterprises. We set n=1 (n is used to count 
the number of .given initial values generated still now). 
Step 1: Obtain the RR-Nash Equilibrium 0x−  based on the given 0
kx  by solving Equations 
Eqs. (22)-(25) with m=1,…,|M|. We replace 0
kx−  with 0x−  as 
1
0
kx +− . 
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Step 2: Obtain the optimal value 0x  based on the given 
1
0
kx +−  with the GA as discussed in 
subsection 4.3. We replace 0
kx  with 0x  as 
1
0
kx + . 
Initial input:
k=0, n=1
The global Nash equilibrium is 
obtained.
The RR-Nash game update 
The manufacturer update 
No equilibrium
Stop
Yes
No
No
Yes
YesNo
Step 0
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
0 0( , )
k kx x−
1
0 0 0 0( , ) to ( , )
k k k kx x x x +− −
1 1 1
0 0 0 0( , ) to ( , )
k k k kx x x x+ + +− −
?ε≤+ maxk k< 1k k= +
maxn n<
0 0
0 0
1, 0
and give a new( , )
n n k
x x−
= + =
Output the optimal results 
Stop
Yes
 
Fig. 5 Procedures for calculating the global Nash equilibrium 
Step 3: With ( 0kx , 0kx− ) and ( 10kx + , 10kx +− ), we calculate the discrepancy: 
| |
1
0
( )
M
k k
m m m
m
x r x+ −
=
= −∑+ . 
(3.1) if +≤ε (ε is a very small positive real number, e.g. 0.0001 ), we obtain the global 
Nash equilibrium according to Eq. (20) and output all the results; (3.2) if +>ε and maxk k< , 
let 1k k= +  and go to Step 1; (3.3) else we assume that, from the current initial variable, +  
can not converge to 0 and go to Step 4. 
Step4: We use the GA to generate another initial variable values. (4.1) If maxn n<  ( maxn  is 
a given maximum population size), we give a new initial value of 0
kx  and 0
kx−  and set k=0 for 
the iterative method in Steps 1-3 to search for a possible Nash equilibrium. Let 1n n= +  and 
go to Step 1. In order to generate a good initial values 0
kx  and 0
kx− , we do not generate them 
randomly but with the GA; ( 0
kx , 0
kx− ) with small +  in Step 3 are remembered to generate an 
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offspring (the new initial value ( 00x , 
0
0x− )). (4.2) else maxn n≥  we think the Nash equilibrium 
does not exist, and stop. 
This flowchart of the proposed algorithm in Fig. 5 includes two main components, one 
being nested inside the other. The inner component is basically iterative and includes steps 1-3. 
They are mainly responsible for calculating the global Nash equilibrium with a given value of 
( 00x , 
0
0x− ). If the equilibrium can not be achieved, a more time-consuming method of the 
outside component (Step 4) is used as a new round of search for the global Nash equilibrium.  
5 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE  
The example supply chain is sketched in Fig. 6. The details of the BOM (bills of materials) 
of the four product variants are shown in Fig. 7, from which the parameter values of gjkδ  and 
jklσ  are assigned. The values of the other parameters are given in Appendix A (see the online 
supplementary material of this paper). 
Module 1
Product 2
Product 3
Product 1
Product 4
Retailer 1
Retailer 2
Retailer 3
Supplier 2
Supplier 3
Supplier 1
Material 2
Material 3
Material 1
Alternative 2
Alternative 3
Alternative 1
Material 2
Material 1
Material 3
Module 2*  
*Module 2 is dummy; each alternative option only consists of one unit of raw materials without production. 
Fig. 6. Settings for the example supply chain 
The computational parameters in the GA are population size=120, number of generations 
=10000, crossover probability =0.7, kmax=nmax=100 and ε=0.001%. The algorithm 
programming is coded in Java 8.0. 
Using the input parameters above (noted as scenario 1), we obtain the results at the global 
Nash game equilibrium shown in Table 1. 
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(a) Product 1 considering a dummy module  (b) Product 2 considering a dummy module 
  
(c) Product 3 considering a dummy module (d) Product 4 considering a dummy module 
Note: [1] Mjk(n) represents that n units of module alternative k in module j are required to produce one unit of 
their immediate upper level products; e.g. M21 (3) in (d) presenting 421 3δ = . [2] Rl(n) represents that n units of raw 
material l are required to produce one unit of their immediate upper level modules. e.g. R3 (1) in (d) representing 
213 1σ = . 
Fig. 7 BOMs of product variants 
To obtain more findings in different cases and the robustness of our algorithm, sensitivity 
analyses are conducted in the other 3 scenarios as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1  The other three scenarios 
Scenario Purpose The changes from scenario 1 Selected 
results 
2 Give a better market 
environments to retailer 
1 
1111β  from -19 to -18, 1212β  from -25 to -24, 1313β  
from -22 to -21, 1414β  from -26 to -25, 111eA  from 
0.35 to 0.36, 122eA  from 0.36 to 0.37, 133eA  from 
0.34 to 0.35, 144eA  from 0.36 to 0.37. 
Table 3 
3 Reduce the production 
costs of product 3 
3FCP  from 7000 and 2500,  1,3FCA  from 4600 to 
2000, and TA from 14000 to 16000. 
Table 4 
4 Make supplier 2’s costs 
relatively higher than 
the other two suppliers.  
13PCR  from 1.4 to 1.1, and 1ORM  from 60 to 45. Table 5 
From our computational results, we obtain some interesting observations as follows: 
1) Our algorithm can find the global Nash game equilibriums efficiently. All the computation 
times are between 20 minutes and 4 hours and most are within 1 hour on a computer with 
a configuration of CPU 2.4G and 528 RAM. This configuration is acceptable in practice 
for solving such problems. 
Product 3 
M21 (2) M13 (2) 
R1 (1) R1 (2) R2 (3) 
Product 4
M23 (3) M13 (2)
R3 (1) R1 (2) R2 (3)
Product 2
M22 (3) M12 (2)
R2 (1) R1 (1) R2 (3)
Product 1 
M21 (3) M11 (2) 
R1 (1) R1 (2) R2 (2) 
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2) Retailers can be benefited from the improvements of other retailers’ market circumstances 
(e.g. the demand of a product becomes less insensitive to the change of its retail price). 
The manufacturer can also be benefited. For example, in scenario 2, some parameters 
have been changed to make the demands of products 1, 2, and 4 less insensitive to the 
change of their market prices compared those in scenario 1. This change brings over a 
20% increase in retailer 1’s profit (compared the results in Table 3 and Table 2). 
Meanwhile, the profits of retailers 2&3, and the manufacturer increase by 4.69%, 5.24%, 
and 7.71%, respectively. This is because the improvement of retailer 1’s market entices 
retailer 1 to raise the retail prices of products, and the manufacturer to invest more on 
advertising products. The other retailers are therefore benefited from the raised prices in 
retailer 1’s markets and the added advertising investments by the manufacturer.  
3) RR-Nash equilibrium can be changed significantly due to the change of the 
manufacturer’s production costs. According to the results in Table 4 for scenario 3, the 
decrease in product 3’s production cost makes the manufacturer decide to produce product 
3. This brings the substantial changes of the retailers’ profits; retailer 1’s profit increases 
by 27.25% but retailer 3’s profit decrease marginally by 1.75% because product 3 in 
retailer 3’s market is less demanding than in retailer 1’s market. 
4) The introduction of a new product can bring a loss to the other products. According to the 
results in Table 4(a), the profits of all the other products decrease in every retailer’s 
market due to the substitutability between product 3 and the other products. 
5) Lower prices offered by one supplier may not be enough to beat other suppliers. For 
example, although the price (PCR32=1 in Table 7) of raw material 2 offered by supplier 3 
is lower than that (PCR12=1.1 in Table 7) offered by supplier 1, the manufacturer still 
prefer to purchase 2286 units of raw material 3 from supplier 1 (see Table 5(b) for 
scenario 4). This is because supplier 1 is already comparably bigger than supplier 2, 
leading to less order cost per unit of raw material from supplier 1 than that from supplier 3. 
6) The supplier selection can be realized by our model. Table 5(b) shows that, with the 
reduction of the purchasing costs from the suppliers 1 and 3, the manufacturer decides not 
to purchase any raw materials from supplier 2 with 2crm = +∞ . However, the re-selection 
of suppliers has little impact on the global Nash equilibrium, which can be observed from 
Table 2 and Table 5. 
7) The discount rate is zero at our Nash equilibrium which differs from the discount rate 
normally larger than 0 in literature. This is because the different inventory partnerships are 
applied. In literature, the retailers’ inventories are managed by themselves, and the 
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manufacturer may therefore be benefited by putting more inventories to its retailers to 
reduce inventory holding cost and order cost. However, In the VMI system, all the 
inventories of the retailers are managed by the manufacturer who cannot be benefited 
from the transfer of the inventory locations. Moreover, the inventory cost at a central 
warehouse (the manufacturer’s) is cheaper than in retailers’. 
8) The optimal product portfolio can be determined by our model. It can be seen that it is not 
economical for the manufacturer to sell product 3. Similarly, module option 3 is not 
produced since it is only used by product 3.  
Table 2: Results for scenario 1 
(a) The results for all retailers 
 Retailer Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4  Total *
mc (10
-2) 
1 67.88 61.02 - 55.72 - - 
2 59.70 69.76 - - - - 
Price 
3 70.69 - - 63.57 - - 
1 1049.85 2850.10 - 631.43 - - 
2 357.29 1681.27 - - - - 
Advertising 
3 2509.19 - - 1501.64 - - 
Demand  1 507 538 0 306 - 17.21 
2 369 569 0 0 - 18.30  
3 574 0 0 456 - 14.03 
 1 14203 10722 0 3848 28773 - 
Profit 2 7877 17641 0 0 25518 - 
 3 16612 0 0 8782 25394 - 
Note. “-” represents no existence of the data or non-valuable to give the data. 
(b) The results for manufacturer 
 Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4 Total 
Advertising 3787 3562 0 6200 - 
Discount rate 0 0 0 0 - 
Quantity 1451 1107 0 762 - 
Profit - - - - 38569 
Alternative 1 2902 0 0 0 2902 
Alternative 2 0 2214 0 1524 3738 
Alternative 3 0 0 0 0 0 
(c) Procurement plan for raw materials 
 Material 1 Material 2 Material 3 *scrm  (10-2) 
Vendor 1 9532 0 0 16.73 
Vendor 2 842 0 2286 48.74 
Vendor 3 3520 20339 0 34.63 
Total 13894 20339 2286 - 
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Table 3: Selected results for scenario 2 
(a) Profit structure for all retailers 
Profit for every product Retailer 
1 2 3 4 
Total profit 
1 17482 13699 0 5373 36554 
2 8329 18389 0 0 26719 
3 17366 0 0 9337 26703 
(b) Market strategies and profits for the manufacturer 
 Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4 Total 
Quantities 1512 1177 0 825 
Advertisement fee 4096 3987 0 6700 
Discount rate 0 0 0 0 
 
Profit - - - - 41353
 
Table 4: Selected results for scenario 3 
(a) Profit structure for all retailers 
Profit for products Retailer 
1 2 3 4 
Total profit 
1 13679 10117 8978 3452 36226 
2 7452 16591 3264 0 27306 
3 16384 0 0 8560 24944 
(b) Market strategies and profits for the manufacturer 
 Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4 Profit
Quantities 1399 1039 638 719 
Advertisement fee 3832 3436 1198 6199 
Discount rate 0 0 0 0 
39269
 
Table 5: Selected results for scenario 4 
(a) Profit structure for all retailers 
Profit for products Retailer 
1 2 3 4 
Total profit 
1 14213 10723 0 3847 28782 
2 7882 17643 0 0 25525 
3 16619 0 0 8783 25402 
(b) Procurement plan for raw materials 
 Material 1 Material 2 Material 3 *
scrm  (10
-2) 
Vendor 1 10487 0 2286 13.81 
Vendor 2 0 0 0 +∞  
Vendor 3 3409 20340 0 35.19 
Sum 13896 20340 2286 - 
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper discusses a VMI supply chain where a manufacturer and multiple retailers 
interact with each other in order to minimize their own profits. Different from other research 
works in the literature, we conduct comprehensive investigation into how the horizontal RR 
Nash-games among retailers and vertical MR-Nash games between the manufacturer and 
retailers are impacted by multiple product substitutability, the market policies (advertising and 
pricing), product configuration, and supplier selections. We propose a dual Nash game model, 
consisting of RR-Nash game between retailers and MR-Nash game between the manufacturer 
and all retailers as a whole. We develop an algorithm to find the global Nash equilibrium 
efficiently. Numerical examples are analyzed to disclose some valuable insights below. 
6.1 Managerial implications 
The simultaneous non-cooperative game (a Nash Game in this paper) among retailers does 
not mean win-lost competition among them. Instead, this model demonstrates their mutual 
interests as a community. In our results, the better market environment of one retailer can lead 
to significant increases in all other enterprises’ profits (see Table 2 and Table 3). When one 
retailer market environment is improved, the optimal retail prices and advertising investments 
will be enhanced. The increased optimal retail prices are beneficial to its substitutable 
products and the same product in other competing retailers. The profits of the other retailers 
can therefore increase as a consequence. 
The changes of the manufacturer’s production costs can have a significant impact on 
retailers’ relative importance to the manufacturer. For example, the changes of production 
costs in scenario 2 make the introduction of a new product (product 3). This brings a 
significant increase in some retailers’ profits (e.g. retailer 1), but has little impact on some 
other retailers’ profits (e.g. retailer 3). Retailer 1 therefore changes from the smallest retailer 
in scenario 1 to the largest one in scenario 2.  
Supplier selection is not only related to the procurement prices of raw materials, but also 
related to the procurement prices of other raw materials and fixed order costs from different 
suppliers. The manufacturer could purchase some units of a kind of raw material from a 
supplier who provides a higher price (than that offered by other suppliers) of the raw material 
(see Table 5(b) for raw material 3 from supplier 1). The reason is explained in Section 5. 
Finally, it is not beneficial for the manufacturer to provide any price discount to retailers 
in this VMI system. This finding differs from that in the literature. In the literature, the 
retailers’ inventories are managed by themselves and the manufacturer may therefore be 
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benefited by pushing more inventories to its retailers to reduce inventory holding and order 
costs. However, In a VMI system, inventories of the retailers are managed by the 
manufacturer who cannot be benefited from the transfer of the inventory locations from its 
warehouse to its retailers’. 
6.2 Limitations and further research 
This study suffers from several limitations and further extensions are necessary in the 
future. Although suppliers, a manufacturer and retailers are considered, this supply chain can 
only be regarded as consisting of two echelons. This is because the suppliers are not treated as 
independent decision makers (game players). In the future study, some suppliers’ decisions 
such as pricing and quantity discount can be considered.  
The game model adopted in this paper is simultaneous and non-cooperative. The 
manufacturer and the retailers are considered of equal status. Other types of supply chain 
coordination schemes should be discussed in the future.  
About the resource constraints, this paper only exemplifies some constraints for inventory 
space and man-hours. In fact, the manufacturer may confront other capacity constraints such 
as human resources; it could be valuable to consider these constraints in order to obtain more 
managerial insights. 
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APPENDIX A: INPUT PARAMETERS 
Table 6 Parameter values related to demand functions 
(a) The value of vmgxy 
v11xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 6.3 -2.1 -1.5 -0.6 
2 -1.9 -1.6 -1 0 
3 -1.2 0 0 -0.5 
v12xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1.6 6.6 -1.6 -1 
2 -1 -1.6 -1 0 
3 -1 0 0 -1 
v13xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1.6 -1.6 6.3 -1.6 
2 -1 -1 -1.6 0 
3 -0.6 0 0 -1 
v14xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.9 7.2 
2 -0.6 -1 -1.1 0 
3 -0.6 0 0 -1.5 
v21xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -2.6 -1.6 -1 -0.6 
2 6.1 -1.9 -1.3 0 
3 -1 0 0 -0.7 
v22xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1 -1.6 -1 -0.6 
2 -1.6 -6.3 -1.6 0 
3 -0.6 0 0 -0.6 
v23xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1 -1.6 -1 -0.6 
2 -1.6 -6.3 -1.6 0 
3 -0.6 0 0 -0.6 
v31xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -1.6 -1.2 -1 -0.9 
2 -1.2 -1 -0.7 0 
3 8.3 0 0 -1.5 
v34xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -0.7 -0.8 -1 -1.5 
2 -0.5 -0.6 -1 0 
3 -1 0 0 7.2 
  Note: v24xy, v32xy, v33xy  are all zero. 
 (b)  The value of eamgxy 
ea11xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.39 0.24 0.22 0.2 
2 0.2 0.16 0.17 0 
3 0.2 0 0 0.16 
ea12xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.23 0.46 0.22 0.18 
2 0.16 0.2 0.16 0 
3 0.16 0 0 0.16 
ea13xy 
ea14xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.19 0.2 0.23 0.42 
2 0.2 0.16 0.17 0 
3 0.6 0 0 0.22 
ea21xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.36 0.3 0.29 0.18 
2 0.4 0.33 0.3 0 
3 0.2 0 0 0.16 
ea22xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.24 
2 0.4 0.41 0.32 0 
3 0.16 0 0 0.16 
ea23xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.28 
2 0.32 0.34 0.37 0 
3 0.16 0 0 0.2 
ea31xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.36 0.31 0.3 0.26 
2 0.2 0.16 0.14 0 
3 0.4 0 0 0.29 
ea34xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.2 0.32 0.38 0.42 
2 0.13 0.18 0.24 0 
3 0.2 0 0 0.43 
Note. ea24xy, ea32xy, ea33xy are all zero 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.2 0.2 0.37 0.2 
2 0.18 0.18 0.2 0 
3 0.18 0 0 0.18 
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.(c)  The value of mgxyβ   
β11xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 -19 2.2 2.1 1.2 
2 2.5 1.6 1.2 0 
3 2.1 0 0 0.8 
β12xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 1.8 -25 1.9 1.5 
2 0.9 2.2 1.1 0 
3 1.2 0 0 0.7 
β13xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 1.5 1.9 -22 2 
2 1 1 21 0 
3 1.1 0 0 1.6 
β14xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 1.3 18 2.5 -26 
2 0.7 1 18 0 
3 0.6 0 0 2.1 
β21xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 2.4 1.6 1 0.7 
2 -19 1.9 1.3 0 
3 1 0 0 0.6  
β22xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 1 2.1 1.2 0.8 
2 1.6 1.8 1.6 0 
3 1.1 0 0 0.5 
β23xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 0.8 1.1 1.8 1 
2 15 25 -25 0 
3 0.6 0 0 0.7 
β31xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.8 
2 1.1 1 0.7 0 
3 -18 0 0 1.9 
β34xy 
x \ y 1 2 3 4 
1 1 1.5 2.1 2.2 
2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0 
3 1.1 0 0 -23 
    The elements of β24xy, β32xy, β33xy are all zero. 
(d): Kmg  
m \ g 1 2 3 4 
1 700 800 800 900 
2 700 900 700 0 
3 900 0 0 800 
(e): ePmgxy=1, , ; , ( ). x m M g G y G x∈ ∈ ∉  
(g):  The value of eAmgy 
eAmgy\ y  1 2 3 4 
eA11y  0.35 0.26 0.2 0.18 
eA12y  0.21 0.36 0.21 0.15 
eA13y  0.17 0.22 0.34 0.21 
eA14y  0.1 0.19 0.21 0.36 
eA21y  0.32 0.25 0.12 0 
eA22y  0.2 0.33 0.2 0 
eA23y  0.17 0.23 0.35 0 
eA24y  0 0 0 0 
eA31y  0.32 0 0 0.2 
eA32y  0 0 0 0 
eA33y  0 0 0 0 
eA34y  0.23 0 0 0.36 
(h):The value of mgyu  ,  y, g G,  m ( )M g∈ ∈   
mgyu \ y  1 2 3 4 
11yu   12 -1.8 -1.5 -1.1 
12yu   -1.7 18 -1.2 -0.9 
13yu   -1 -1.9 11 -1.9 
14yu   -0.9 -1.1 -2.1 16 
21yu   12 -2.2 -1 0 
22yu   -1.7 18 -1.8 0 
23yu   -1.7 -1.9 11 0 
24yu   0 0 0 0 
31yu   11 0 0 -1 
32yu   0 0 0 0 
33yu   0 0 0 0 
34yu   -1.3 0 0 18 
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Table 7  Values of some other parameters 
 
HP1 HP2 HP 3 HP 4 TMP 
6.12 4.9 5.8 5.7 20000 
 
PCP1 PCP2 PCP3 PCP4 
1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 
 
ORM1 ORM2 ORM3 OP1 OP2 OP3 
60 45 95 50 40 40 
 
FCP1 FCP2 FCP3 FCP 4 
1800 2000 7000 3100 
 
w0 w1 w2 w3 
1 1 1 1 
 
HRM1 HRM2 HRM3 FCM1 FCM2 
0.45 0.48 0.52 2000 0 
mgζ  
m \ g 1 2 3 4 
1 1.8 1.8 1.4 2.1 
2 1.4 1.8 1.5 0 
3 1.4 0 0 2 
HRmg 
m \ g 1 2 3 4 
1 6.2 5.1 6.1 6.3 
2 6.2 5.1 6.1 0 
3 5.5 4.8 0 5.3  
pw1 pw2 pw3 pw4 
36 34 32 39 
HRmg 
m \ g 1 2 3 4 
1 6.2 5.1 6.1 6.3 
2 6.2 5.1 6.1 0 
3 5.5 4.8 0 5.3 
PCRsl 
s \l 1 2 3 
1 0.9 1.1 1.4 
2 1 +∞  1.2 
3 1.1 1 +∞  
FCAjk 
j \ k 1 2 3 
1 1700 1900 4600 
2 0 0 0 
TPmg 
m \ g 1 2 3 4 
1 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 
2 1.5 2.5 1.8 ∞  
3 1.4 ∞  ∞  1.6 
PCAjk 
j \ k 1 2 3 
1 0.9 1.1 1.2 
2 0 0 0 
13350TA = , the values of other parameters not given 
are not included in our calculations. 
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